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Individual Differences in Decision-Making 
 
An Honors Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in the 
Department of Psychology. 
By 
Catelyn N. Shipp 
Under the mentorship of Dr. Ty W. Boyer 
ABSTRACT 
When making decisions, most people tend to avoid uncertain outcomes or risks. 
However, individual differences, such as optimism versus pessimism and liberalism 
versus conservatism, may lead to variable approaches and outcomes in the decision-
making process. Thus, the goal of this research is to examine individual differences in 
decision-making preferences and whether these associate with personality characteristics 
(i.e., optimism/pessimism and conservative/liberal views). To test this, the current study 
involves a probabilistic gambling task, adapted from behavioral judgment and decision-
making research.  Participants are shown “wheel-of-fortune-like” spinner wheel stimuli 
divided into green, red, and gray sections.  The relative proportion of each color 
represents the respective probability of a win, loss, or no change in a bank of points, and 
participants’ task is to choose between two simultaneously presented wheels.  In a key set 
of trials, participants are presented with truly ambiguous choices, in which the relative 
win-to-loss ratios are objectively identical, though the likelihood of neutral outcomes 
vary.  In addition, participants complete the Revised Life Orientation Test, which 
measures optimistic versus pessimistic views, and the Liberal-Conservative Self-Report 
Scale.  
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Introduction 
 Decision-making involves numerous cognitive processes. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), for instance, describe decision-making as a combination of an individual’s 
perceptions of choice outcomes (i.e., win-loss probabilities), attitudes towards ambiguity, 
and tendencies towards risk. Thus, decisions depend on the both the information available 
for each choice and on how the information is evaluated by an individual (Kwak & 
Huettel, 2018). Slovic (2000) provides an illustration of this concept in a study on the 
effects of communicating a psychiatric patient’s risk for violence in probability (e.g., 
10%) versus frequency formats (e.g., 10 out of 100) in a decision to release the patient 
from a hospital. Professionals who viewed the patient’s risk of violence in a frequency 
format (e.g., 2 out of 10) were twice as likely to deny the patient’s discharge as 
professionals who viewed the patient’s risk of violence in a probability format (e.g., 
20%). The findings suggest that the frequency format evoked a more lucid or frightening 
description which led to a higher decision weight despite the identical chance of violence 
(Slovic, 2000). Similarly, Kahneman (2011) explains how the focus of one’s attention 
can lead to misconstrued perceptions of the chance of unlikely outcomes.  
Furthermore, decision-making tasks involving visual stimuli require numerous 
perceptual processes that also influence the decision-making process (Kwak & Huettel, 
2017; Jarvenpaa, 1990). For instance, Parkhurst and colleagues (2002) examined how 
salience guides visual attention and cognitive processing when one evaluates a stimulus. 
In their study, participants looked at a series of images while the researchers tracked eye 
movements. Through the eye-tracking data, the researchers found that early attentional 
processes select only a few of the possible stimuli to further process cognitively 
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(Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002). Therefore, salience, or the amount of attention 
devoted to part of a stimulus, can alter the decision-making process by influencing how 
an individual initially views and interprets the information presented (Beesley, Hanafi, 
Vadillo, Shanks, & Livesey, 2018). These findings are strengthened by Seeley and 
colleagues (2007) identification of a neural “salience network” which consists of the right 
anterior insula, the left anterior insular, and the dorsal anterior cingulate. Recent research 
shows that this salience network organizes information from the environment before the 
information reaches the prefrontal cortex for more complex processing, which includes 
decision-making (Chand & Dhamala, 2016). Thus, how an individual visually perceives a 
stimulus is crucial to the outcome of the decision-making process. In accordance with 
these findings, the present study seeks to examine if individual differences, such as one’s 
personal tendency to be optimistic versus pessimistic or one’s personal tendency to be 
liberal versus conservative, cause different processing and interpretation of visual stimuli, 
even if those stimuli should not objectively affect the decision-making process.  
When making a decision, people tend to show aversion towards ambiguity by 
avoiding uncertain outcomes (Pulford & Gill, 2013). However, individual differences 
lead people to approach ambiguous decision-making tasks differently (Seale, Rapoport, 
& Budescu, 1995). These individual differences are partly the result of expectations 
created from prior experiences, which interact with ongoing perceptual processes to make 
sense of the complex, surrounding environment (Chabris & Simon, 2009). Furthermore, 
Levin and colleagues (2002) report that personality traits are critical components of the 
decision-making process. Important for our purposes, previous studies have shown that 
individual differences in personality traits may relate to ambiguity-aversion and 
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ambiguity-tolerance in a decision-making task involving uncertain outcomes or risks 
(Pulford, 2009). Specifically, those high in positive emotionality or optimism pay greater 
attention to positive stimuli; whereas, those high in negative emotionality or pessimism 
pay more attention to negative stimuli (Hainaut, Monfort, & Bolmont, 2006). Relatedly, 
Wenglert and Rosen (2000) define dispositional optimism as a personality trait in which 
individuals maintain hopeful expectations in a variety of both positive and negative 
situations. Thus, optimism and pessimism may affect both how an individual interprets a 
stimulus or an event, and the environmental cues that they initially focus on (Isaacowitz, 
2005).  For instance, Segerstrom (2001) found that optimists automatically directed more 
attention towards positive stimuli in an Emotional Stroop paradigm, while pessimists 
automatically focused more attention on negative stimuli. Steginga and Occhipinti (2006) 
offer a possible explanation to the phenomenon described above, as they found that 
individuals who score high in trait optimism do not experience feelings of anxiety as 
intensely as others do during a decision-making process. This relationship was further 
examined in a gambling study which found that those high in dispositional optimism 
maintain confidence and positive expectations while gambling, even after experiencing a 
loss (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). Furthermore, Kahneman (2011) found that 
entrepreneurs who score high in trait optimism show a willingness to take more risks, and 
they often misread risks through the belief that they are making sensible decisions even 
when they are not. Thus, dispositional optimism (or pessimism) may lead one to 
irrationally consider gain and loss probabilities while making a decision (Kahneman, 
2011). These biases associated with trait optimism and trait pessimism reveal the mind’s 
tendency to see patterns in the world and to make evaluations and decisions based on 
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those invented patterns; however, those patterns can misconstrue the decision-making 
process as one may accidentally misinterpret the reality of a situation (Chabris & Simons, 
2009). 
Furthermore, we often see the impact of individual differences in political 
ideologies in real-life judgement and decision-making processes. Moreover, trait 
optimism and trait pessimism, as described above, may correlate to the differences in the 
political ideologies that we see today. As McCrae (1996) claims, one’s political ideology 
reflects deep-rooted personality traits, for these ideologies are far more enduring than a 
simple preference for a current political party or a social movement. Thus, these 
ideologies, stemming from individual personality differences, could play an important 
role in understanding variability across decision-making under uncertainty. On the one 
hand, liberal-minded individuals tend to take a more positive view of their surroundings 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), and they score higher in measures of openness, which 
means that they more easily welcome novel or unexpected experiences (McCrae, 1996; 
Caprara, Barbaranelli, Zimbardo, 1999). On the other hand, conservative-minded 
individuals tend to take a more negative view of their surroundings (Graham et al., 2009). 
These individuals show a more closed-minded preference for things that are predictable 
by behaving in a certainty-oriented and stiff manner (McCrae, 1996; Driscoll, Hamilton, 
& Sorrentino, 1991). Therefore, those who score high in conservativism may be 
characterized as more pessimistic, focusing on the negative and showing aversion to 
ambiguity in the midst of new experiences (Chirumbolo et al., 2004). Thus, a connection 
between optimism and liberalism and a connection between pessimism and conservatism 
may be influential in drawing conclusions from participant decisions in the current study.  
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It is important to note that the variability between liberal and conservative 
ideologies can be partially explained by more basic biological and cognitive processes. 
For example, previous research has suggested that gaze-cuing effects are innate and 
automatic shifts in attention in response to a directed cue (Hood, Driver, & Willen, 1998; 
Farroni et al., 2004). However, Dodd, Hibbing, and Smith (2011) found that participants 
who scored high in conservatism failed to show a gaze-cuing effect when asked to react 
to a target (e.g. a drawing of a face) displayed on a screen. In contrast, liberal participants 
showed a much larger gaze-cuing effect by consistently reacting to the targets that 
flashed on the screen (Dodd et al., 2011). Theoretically, these differences in attention 
may be the result of conservative-minded individuals valuing autonomy and consistency 
more than liberal-minded individuals, and therefore, conservatives may be less 
responsive to and trusting of outside influences (Dodd et al., 2011). In a later study, Dodd 
and colleagues (2012) found that conservative participants spent significantly more time 
looking at negative images than liberal participants, similar to those who score low in 
trait optimism as described above. Furthermore, political attitudes have been associated 
with physiological responses to fear and disgust (Oxley et al., 2008). For instance, 
individuals with lower physiological responsiveness to sudden noises and menacing 
pictures were more likely to support liberal ideology than those who displayed higher 
responsiveness to similar stimuli (Oxley at al., 2008). Thus, one’s physiological 
responsiveness may indicate conservative or liberal preferences, and therefore, to what 
degree an individual accepts or rejects uncertainty and change (Oxley et al., 2008). As a 
result, these physiological tendencies may also reveal whether one views unexpected or 
ambiguous circumstances in an optimistic or a pessimistic light. These findings are 
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strengthened by Vigil (2010) who found that conservatives were more likely to report an 
“emotionally ambiguous” face as expressing a threatening emotion, taking a pessimistic 
view of an ambiguous stimuli, while liberals were more likely to assign a more positive 
emotion, such as “surprise,” to the same “emotionally ambiguous” face. Therefore, these 
individual differences in ideologies may enhance our understanding of participant 
decisions in the ambiguous gamble presented in the current study.   
We are often faced with ambiguous decision-making tasks in which there are no 
better options among different choice outcomes. Therefore, the present study seeks to 
identify consistencies of decision-making under uncertainty, and further, examines if the 
way in which individuals make those decisions relates to levels of optimism-liberalism 
and pessimism-conservatism as measured by our selected assessments. To do this, the 
current study involved a spinning wheel gambling task, loosely modeled after Smith, 
Chein, and Steinberg (2014). Participants were shown a pair of spinning wheels on a 
computer screen each divided into three sections: a win section (green), a loss section 
(red), and a neutral section (gray). The probability of each outcome was yoked to the size 
of the portion of the wheel composed of each color, and the stimuli varied across trials so 
as to convey high, moderate, and low probabilities of wins, losses, and neutral outcomes. 
With this gambling model, we strove to determine if individual differences in perception 
related to the likelihood that one would interpret a neutral stimulus (gray) in an 
ambiguity-averse or ambiguity-tolerant lens, when the rational decision would be to 
ignore the neutral portion of a stimulus that had no bearing on the objective probability or 
value structure of possible outcomes. Since the gray sections of the two wheels presented 
were outcome-neutral, we contrasted two choice alternatives (i.e two spinning wheels) 
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that illustrated equivalent relative win-to-loss ratios (i.e. green: red sections) but with 
different sized gray (neutral) sections to identify interesting patterns of behavior in the 
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli despite the equivalent outcomes displayed.  
Tymula and colleagues (2012) investigated similar questions in their study that 
found that adolescents’ risk-taking behaviors tend to be the result of a tolerance to 
unknown outcomes. This study used a paradigm consisting of 160 choice trials where 
participants were shown a certain pay-off of $5 and a gamble with a pay-off of more than 
$5 or a pay-off of nothing. These gambles were displayed as a mixture of 100 red and 
blue poker chips, with each color defined as the winning color in one-half of the trials. 
The participants were told that at the end of the study, one of the 160 trials would be 
randomly selected and the participant’s decision in that trial could result in actual 
payment (Tymula et al., 2012). Therefore, if participants picked a gamble instead of the 
certain pay-off in the random selected trial, they would get to reach into a bag filled with 
blue and red poker chips at the conclusion of the study. If they drew the winning color 
specified in that round, they would win the amount that was determined in that particular 
trial (Tymula et al., 2012). In the risky trials, participants were offered a chance to win a 
certain $5 and a gamble offering a chance to win more than $5 displayed by the red and 
blue poker chips. In the ambiguous trials, participants had to choose between winning a 
certain $5 or a gamble offering a chance to win more than $5 with a gray lid covering 50 
of the 100 poker chips displayed. Important for our current study were the differences in 
participant responses despite the equivalent win-loss likelihood (e.g., 50% chance of 
choosing a red poker chip and 50% chance of choosing a blue poker chip) (Ellsberg, 
1961). Both colors of poker chips were the winning colors in one-half of the trials; 
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however, the subjects did not know whether the red or blue trial would be selected at the 
conclusion of the study for actual payment (Tymula et al., 2012). Therefore, an 
ambiguity-tolerant individual should rationally view the ambiguous gambles the same as 
the risky gambles, with a 50% chance of winning and a 50% of losing. In contrast, an 
ambiguity-resistant individual may treat the ambiguous gamble with a lesser 25% (e.g. 
only 25 red chips) chance of winning, aggregating the gray covering with their chances 
for a loss; an ambiguity-tolerant individual may behave as if there were an increased 75% 
(e.g. 75 red chips) chance of winning, aggregating the gray covering with their chances 
for a win (Tymula et al., 2012).  
Moreover, Zhao, Huang, Li, Zhao, and Peng (2015) performed a study of trait 
dispositional optimism and decision-making as it may occur in a medical setting. The 
researchers showed participants graphs of cancer patient outcomes after surgery and after 
radiation. On the graphs, a shaded region indicated patient survival and a blank region 
indicated patient death. Participants were then asked to decide which should be used (i.e., 
surgery or radiation) on a current patient (Zhao et al., 2015). As documented in previous 
studies, how an individual develops a frame, or a personal perspective, of a current 
situation plays a crucial role in their decision-making process (Wang, 2004). For 
instance, individuals low in dispositional optimism tend to form negative frames; 
therefore, they focus more on possibly threatening stimuli (Zhao et al., 2015). In contrast, 
those high in dispositional optimism tend to form positive frames, focusing on the 
positive in a situation (Zhao et al., 2015). Thus, when participants were asked to decide 
which treatment to use on a current patient, those low in trait optimism were more likely 
to choose radiotherapy due to its high, short-term treatment survival rate, and did not 
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consider radiotherapy’s lower, long-term survival rate in comparison to surgery (Zhao et 
al., 2015). Therefore, participants low in trait optimism focused greater attention to short-
term outcomes and to the blank area of the graph, which indicated death, and explained 
their decisions in more pessimistic language instead of considering the complete nature of 
the graph and its representation of both short-term and long-term treatment outcomes 
(Zhao et al., 2015). In contrast, participants high in trait optimism were more likely to 
choose surgery which had a low treatment survival rate but had a high 5-year survival 
rate in comparison to radiotherapy (Zhao et al., 2015).  As a result, those high in trait 
optimism demonstrated confidence in potential positive outcomes, payed more attention 
to long-term possibilities, and were better able to bear the chance of unfortunate 
circumstances (Zhao et al., 2015). Therefore, optimists were able to look beyond the 
threat of the short-term outcomes of surgery and to focus on the positive expectations for 
the increased long-term survival rates compared to those who had undergone 
radiotherapy (Zhao et al., 2015). 
The findings listed above may be the result of the interaction of the two systems 
of reasoning: the rational process which logically interprets choice alternatives to decide 
what action to take, and the emotional process which forms affective perceptions, and in 
doing so can be optimistically or pessimistically biased (Bracha & Brown, 2010). System 
Two, or the rational process, is the only one that carefully evaluates choice outcomes 
while making decisions; however, the biases developed by System One, or the emotional 
process, continuously affect System Two (Kahneman, 2011). Therefore, these two 
processes work together while an individual makes a decision (Bracha & Brown, 2010), 
and this interaction may result in individual differences in the processing of a neutral 
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stimulus in an ambiguous task. Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) tested this model in a 
study that observed differences in participant choices with two identical gambles. The 
first gamble had a 10:100 chance of winning, and the second had a 1:10 chance of 
winning. Despite being told that the gambles were identical, participants showed a 
tendency to choose the gamble with more winning tickets (10:100), justifying their 
decision by the greater number of potential winners in that gamble than the 1:10 gamble 
(e.g., 100 winners versus 10 winners). Amsel, Close, Sadler, and Klaczynski (2009) 
claim that these findings were the result of the dual-process approach described above, 
where participants made irrational judgements due to reliance on the emotional process of 
following their gut-feelings about the situation. In contrast, if participants would have 
relied on the rational process, they would engaged in more effortful and systematic 
thinking, and would have realized that both gambles held identical win-loss potential 
(Amsel et al, 2009). 
However, as Kahneman (2011) explains, a “lazy” System Two often takes a path 
of minimal effort by adhering to the suggestions of System One, and therefore, failing to 
engage in effortful thinking. For example, De Martino and colleagues (2006), initially 
showed participants a starting amount of money that they would receive (e.g., “You 
receive 50 euros”); however, they were not able to keep the entire amount. Instead, they 
had to choose between a risk-free option and a gamble option (De Martino, Kumaran, 
Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). The risk-free options were presented in both a gain-frame 
(e.g., “Keep 20 euros.”) and a loss-frame (e.g., “Lose 30 euros.”) across the trials (De 
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). The gamble option was presented as a pie 
chart to visually display the winning (green) and losing (red) probabilities (De Martino, 
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Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). The participants were asked to choose between the 
risk-free option and the gamble option, though they both represented an equivalent win-
loss potential (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). Therefore, a rational 
decision in this task would be to select either option, regardless of the frame. However, 
the results revealed that some subjects were highly influenced by the framing of the 
problem and chose the risk-free option only in the gain-frame, but not in the loss-frame 
(De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). Further, fMRI results showed active 
firing of the amygdala, or the emotional center of the brain involved with System One, as 
the participants influenced by the framing of the problem made their decision. In contrast, 
those who were not influenced by the framing of the problem showed increased 
activation of the prefrontal cortex, or the rational center of the brain (De Martino, 
Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). This aligns with the rationale behind the dual-
systems approach in which the emotionally-biased System One can influence the 
decision-making strategies of System Two (Kahneman, 2011). This concept is 
strengthened by what is known as the common “affect heuristic,” which claims that 
people attend to their emotions (System One) in making judgments and decisions 
(System Two), oftentimes without even acknowledging that they are doing so (Slovic et 
al., 2002). As a result of similar findings, Chabris and Simons (2009) claim that 
successful decision-making relies on the ability to know when to trust personal intuitions 
and when to engage in more controlled thinking. These conclusions reveal crucial 
components as to what may explain the various preferences among optimistically-
liberally-biased and pessimistically-conservatively-biased participants in the present 
study.  
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Importantly, recent research has questioned the ability of behavioral tasks to 
accurately measure individual differences in risk-taking and decision-making in 
comparison to propensity measures, such as standard questionnaires (Frey et al., 2017). 
Two possible explanations for these findings have emerged: a problem with the 
instrument, or a problem with the construct (Palminteri & Chevallier, 2018). The first 
explanation argues that behavioral tasks measure both a central process (e.g., risk-taking) 
alongside secondary processes (e.g., responses to stimuli) which may interact and 
consequently alter results. The second explanation argues that risk-taking and decision-
making are constructs that change over time, and they should be measured with such a 
dynamic state in mind (Palminteri & Chevallier, 2018). For example, how a participant 
responds to a momentary behavioral task may not reflect how he or she will consistently 
respond to other decision-making tasks, while self-report measures may provide a more 
accurate representation of a participant’s decision-making tendencies by combining 
previous experiences stored in the his or her memory. Therefore, behavioral tasks should 
be performed with an understanding that the variability found in participant responses to 
the tasks reveals actual changes in momentary risk-taking tendencies (Palminteri & 
Chevallier, 2018). Moreover, Kahnemen (2011) argues that decision-making within 
gambling models accurately reflects complex, real-world decisions as such tasks 
represent how decision-making outcomes can never be certain. Therefore, in the current 
study, we designed a probabilistic gambling task (PGT) modeled after Smith, Chein, and 
Steinberg (2014) with two wheels divided into sections colored green (win), red (loss), 
and gray (neutral) to investigate the differences that emerge with liberal-optimistic and 
conservative-pessimistic bias in a decision-making situation with some degree of 
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ambiguity. In many of the trials, participants will view wheels of identical win 
probabilities; however, we will manipulate the gray, or neutral, sections of the wheels to 
determine whether participants considered the gray section as a win, a loss, or neither. In 
addition, participants will complete the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R; Scheier, 
Carver, & Bridges, 1994) to assess individual tendencies towards optimism and 
pessimism and the Liberal-Conservative Self-Report Scale (Lambert & Raichle, 2000) to 
measure how liberal or how conservative participants consider themselves to be.  
In light of more recent research, which views dispositional optimists as viewing 
circumstances through “rose-colored interpretations” (Isaacowitz, 2005), we hypothesize 
that participants who score high in trait optimism will interpret the same display wheels 
differently than participants who score low in trait optimism. For instance, eye-tracking 
data analyzed how attention was devoted to neutral (e.g., emotionless faces) and to 
negative (e.g., skin cancer) stimuli among optimists and pessimists (Isaacowitz, 2005). 
The data revealed that optimists were more likely to avoid paying attention to negative 
stimuli, which suggests that optimists in the current study may also wear similar “rose-
colored glasses” while processing visual information by selectively attending to the 
positive stimuli (e.g., green sections) and viewing the ambiguous stimuli (e.g., gray 
sections) in a more positive light (Isaacowitz, 2005). Furthermore, we predict that those 
who score high in trait optimism will also score high in liberal ideology and display 
similar wheel-choice patterns, as those of a liberal orientation are also more likely to 
avoid focusing on negative stimuli (Dodd et al., 2012). Therefore, on the one hand, we 
predict that ambiguity-tolerant participants who aggregate the green (win) and the gray 
(neutral) sections, interpreting the neutral sections of the stimuli as a win and selecting 
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wheels with a large green plus gray proportion, will also score high in trait optimism and 
in liberalism as captured by our selected assessments. On the other hand, we predict that 
ambiguity-resistant participants who aggregate the red (loss) and the gray (neutral) 
sections, interpreting the neutral sections of the stimuli as a loss and avoiding wheels 
with a large red (loss) plus gray (neutral) proportion, will score low in trait optimism and 
high in conservative ideology.  
Further, we also predict that those who view the wheel in an ambiguity-tolerant 
lens will experience superior outcomes to those who view the wheel through an 
ambiguity-resistant lens. For instance, the personality systems interaction theory (PSI) 
says that individuals are inclined to take either an action or a state orientation, and this 
orientation will affect the decision-making process (Koole & Coenen, 2007). According 
to the findings of Kuhl (1994), an action orientation leads individuals to focus heavily on 
a desired goal, and therefore, results in positive expectations and good problem-solving 
strategies. This definition aligns neatly to that of the dispositional optimist (Wenglert & 
Rosen, 2000) and the liberal-minded individual (McCrae, 1996) as described above. 
Further, it adds an understanding to previous findings of high levels of trait optimism 
found among some of the top entrepreneurs who were able to see opportunities to 
succeed in places that others may have not (Silver, 1985). In an analysis of sixteen 
studies looking at the relationship between various individual differences and success, for 
example, it was trait optimism that appeared most consistently throughout the literature 
as a defining characteristic of those who experienced high levels of success (Crane & 
Crane, 2007). Thus, those of an action-orientation (e.g., liberal-optimists), may be more 
likely to outperform those of a state orientation (e.g., conservative-pessimists), as those of 
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a state orientation may dwell only on the negative possibilities of an event and 
consequently impede their ability to make effective decisions (Kuhl, 1994). Similarly, 
Shook and Fazio (2009) had liberal and conservative participants play a computerized 
game called “BeanFest” where participants decided to accept or reject differently shaped 
and marked beans. If the participant accepted the bean, the value of the beans with the 
same shape and marking were then shown (e.g. +10 or -10). Participants were told to 
accumulate as many points as they could (Shook and Fazio, 2009). Shook and Fazio 
(2009) found that liberals chose ambiguous bean types more often than conservatives in 
the hopes of accumulating more points (e.g., liberals took an action orientation towards 
the task), even though doing so ran the risk of losing points. We, therefore, hypothesize 
that those who score high in trait optimism and high in liberalism will take an action-
orientation while engaging with our paradigm, taking the risk to play the wheels with a 
tolerance to ambiguity, selecting wheels with a higher proportion of the neutral (gray) 
area and opening the opportunity for more chances to win and ultimately leading to 
higher overall scores. In contrast, we predict that those who score low in trait optimism 
and high in conservatism will take a state-orientation while engaging with our paradigm, 
taking a resistant stance against ambiguity by refusing to spin wheels with a higher 
proportion of the neutral (gray) area and losing opportunities to win and ultimately 
resulting in lower overall scores.  
In sum, within our particular paradigm, an individual should objectively ignore 
the neutral (gray) sections of the wheels, as they bear no true win or loss potential; 
however, we predict that a majority of participants will rely on a tolerant or resistant 
intuition towards ambiguity in making a decision between the two wheels presented. We 
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further predict that participants who view the wheels in an ambiguity-tolerant lens will 
obtain higher scores by taking risks on the more neutral-dense wheels in our paradigm, 
while the participants who view the wheels with an ambiguity-resistant lens will obtain 
lower scores as a result of missed chances. Finally, we predict that those who take an 
ambiguity-tolerant position while engaging with our paradigm will score higher in trait 
optimism and in liberal ideology, while those who take an ambiguity-resistant position 
while engaging with our paradigm will score lower in trait optimism and higher in 
conservative ideology.  
Method 
Participants  
Participants consisted of 104 undergraduate students (77 female, 27 male) 
between the ages of 19 - 23 years (M = 19.12, SD = 1.19)1. Ten participants were 
eliminated due to predetermined exclusionary criteria. Seven participants were eliminated 
because they failed to respond to the objectively superior option in at least 75% of trials. 
Furthermore, 1 participant was eliminated because they did not respond within 3 standard 
deviations of the mean response time in at least 75% of trails. Lastly, 2 participants were 
eliminated due to technological difficulties which resulted in incomplete task and survey 
completion. Participants were recruited from a participant pool maintained by the 
Department of Psychology at Georgia Southern University using an online participant 
                                                          
1 To meet the University Honors Program requirements, this sample was used for the 
purposes of completing this undergraduate thesis. Data collection is ongoing for final 
project completion.  
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recruitment software (i.e., SONA). All participants provided written informed consent 
prior to participating and received course credit for their contribution the study.  
Procedure 
 Upon arrival, participants were greeted and given an informed consent form 
detailing the purpose of the study, the compensation granted for participation in the 
study, and the participant’s freedom to withdraw at any point in time. Once the informed 
consent form was signed, participants were directed to a quiet, isolated cubical equipped 
with a 22-inch computer screen with a standard keyboard and mouse. After the 
participant was seated, the researcher gave verbal instructions to the participants on how 
to commence and progress through the spinning wheel gambling task, pausing at the end 
to ask for questions before the experiment began.  
To begin the experiment, the participants read the written instructions provided 
for the wheel of fortune gambling task. These instructions informed participants that they 
would be shown two wheels with different win-loss probabilities and then asked to 
decide which wheel they would rather play. Participants were instructed that they would 
either accumulate (i.e., landing on a green section), lose (i.e., landing on a red), or 
maintain (i.e., landing on a gray) points, depending on which wheel they choose and its 
win-loss-neutral probabilities. Participants were also informed that the goal of the 
gambling task was to accumulate as many points as possible by the end of the study.  
After reviewing the instructions, participants began the gambling task with 4 
practice trials, where the decisions made between the two wheels presented had no effect 
on the participant’s final score. After completing the practice trials, participants moved 
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into the 132 experimental trials which consisted of displays of each win-dominant (6 
wheels), loss-dominant wheels (6 wheels), and ambiguous wheels (3 wheels) in a two-
wheel, forced-choice format. Participants viewed two wheels at a time and used the 
mouse to select which of the two wheels they would rather play. After selecting a wheel, 
that wheel spun and landed on a green, red, or gray section contingent on the probability 
derived from the proportion of the chosen wheel. If the selected wheel landed on a green 
section, the participant won ten points; if the wheel landed on a red section, the 
participant lost ten points; and if the wheel landed on a gray section, the participant 
neither gained nor lost points. Total points were tallied and shown throughout the task, 
and a final score was shown at the end of the experimental trials.  
After finishing the gambling task, participants completed a computerized version 
of the 10-item Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) 
to evaluate levels of optimism or pessimism followed by a computerized version of the 
Liberal-Conservative Self-Report Scale (Lambert & Raichle, 2000) to evaluate how 
liberal or conservative participants considered themselves to be. When finished with the 
assessments, participants were thanked for their participation in the study and given 
further details on the general purpose and predictions made by the researchers.   
Stimuli 
 In each trial, participants played a “wheel of fortune” gambling task loosely 
modeled after Smith et al. (2014), with differently colored sections (see Figure 1 in 
Appendix A). The stimuli were developed and animated using 3DSMax, and E-Prime 3 
(PST Software, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) was used for stimulus presentation and data 
recording. The colored sections of the wheels represented the probability of gaining 10 
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points (green), losing 10 points (red), or neither winning nor losing points (gray). The 
three outcomes (i.e. green, red, gray) varied in proportion in each trial and between the 
two wheels simultaneously presented to participants on the screen. Participants chose 
which of the two wheels to play by selecting it with a computer mouse. Fifteen different 
win-to-loss ratios were portrayed on the wheels throughout the game (see Table 1 in 
Appendix B). These included: 6 win-dominant wheels, where the chance of winning 
(green) was at least .50; 6 loss-dominant wheels, where the chance of losing was at least 
.50; and 3 ambiguous wheels, where there was an equal chance of winning (green) and 
losing (red) despite differing proportions of the neutral (gray) sector. Trials were 
constructed out of all possible pairings of all of these stimuli with purposeful 
oversampling of stimulus pairs with equal win and loss outcomes probabilities (i.e., the 
three ambiguous wheels). For instance, one wheel in an ambiguous trial could have 
37.5% green, 37.5% red, and 25% gray, and would be pitted against another wheel with 
25% green, 25% red, and 50% gray. These two options are identical in terms of relative 
win: loss potential but differ in terms of the probability of the ambiguous (e.g., neutral) 
component. This study is concerned with whether preferences in these trials would 
reliably vary across individuals. The pairing of these various wheels across trials thus 
evaluated the participants’ attitude towards risk (towards known probabilities) and 
attitudes towards ambiguity (towards unknown probabilities).  
In the task, the participants were shown two wheels and chose which wheel to 
“play,” both of which either displayed equivalent expected outcomes with one wheel 
displaying a larger ambiguous (gray) sector, or one wheel presenting a more probable win 
or loss outcome than the other alternative. When a participant chose which wheel to 
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“play,” the chosen wheel spun and landed on one of the colored-sections, depending on 
the win-to-loss probability of that wheel. If the selected wheel landed on a green section, 
“YOU WIN +10” was displayed on the screen; if the wheel landed on a red section, 
“YOU LOSE -10” was displayed on the screen; and if the wheel landed on a gray section, 
“NO CHANGE +0” was displayed on the screen before participants progressed to the 
next trial. In all trials, the total score was calculated and shown at the bottom of the 
screen.  
With this paradigm, we focused on the trials that presented two wheels that 
illustrated equal probabilities of win and loss outcomes but that displayed varying neutral 
outcome probabilities. With this focus, we defined an ambiguity-tolerant strategy as one 
where a participant, after being shown two wheels in a forced-choice format, chose to 
play the wheel with a winning (green) sector plus a neutral (gray) sector that was equal to 
or greater than .50. In other words, ambiguity-tolerant participants were those who 
aggregated the winning (green) and the neutral (gray) sectors to make their judgement, 
and therefore, chose to play the wheel with the greatest winning (green) sectors plus 
neutral (gray) sectors across the trials. For example, when presented with a choice 
between one wheel with 37.5% green, 37.5% red, and 25% gray and another wheel with 
25% green, 25% red, and 50% gray, and ambiguity-tolerant individua would tend to 
aggregate the green and the gray portions and select the second wheel (i.e., preferring 
75% to 62.5% green plus gray). In contrast, we defined an ambiguity-resistant strategy as 
avoiding the wheel option that represented the largest loss (red) plus neutral (gray) 
sections in the forced choice presented. Therefore, ambiguity-resistant participants were 
those who aggregated the neutral sector (gray) and the loss sector (red) to make their 
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judgements, and therefore, avoided playing wheels with the largest loss (red) plus neutral 
(gray) sections across trials. For instance, when presented with the same choice outlined 
above between one wheel with 37.5% green, 37.5% red, and 25% gray and another wheel 
with 25% green, 25% red, and 50% gray, an ambiguity-resistant individual would tend to 
aggregate the red and the gray portions and select the first wheel (i.e., preferring 62.5% to 
75% red plus gray). Participants completed 4 practice trials and then 132 experimental 
trials, which resulted in a total time of roughly 20 minutes per participant.  
Self-Report Measures 
Revised Life-Orientation Test (LOT-R) 
 After completing the gambling task, participants were given the 10-item Revised 
Life Orientation Test (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) to assess levels of 
optimism and pessimism (see Appendix C). The LOT consists of 3 optimistic statements, 
3 pessimistic statements, and 3 filler statements. Scores of the test are based only on 
items 1, 2, 4, 7, 9 and 10, with the remaining questions serving as fillers. The final scores 
are computed by reverse coding the responses to the pessimistic statements and adding 
those scores to the responses from the optimistic statements, with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of optimism. Sample items include “In uncertain times, I usually expect the 
best” and “If something can go wrong for me, it will.” Participants responded to each 
statement on a 5-point scale where 0=strongly disagree, 1 = disagree, 2 = neutral, 3 = 
agree, and 4 = strongly agree (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, construct validity, and predictive validity have been 
shown for this test (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Further, Chiesi et al’s 
(2013) item response theory analyses increased confidence in the assessment’s ability to 
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measure levels of optimism. A reliability analysis from the data in our sample also 
indicated adequate reliability of this measure (α = .76).  
Liberal-Conservative Self-Report Scale 
 After completing the LOT-R, participants completed the Liberal-Conservative 
Self-Report Scale (see Appendix D). In this survey, participants report how conservative 
and how liberal they consider themselves to be on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all 
conservative or liberal) to 10 (extremely conservative or liberal) (Lambert & Raichle, 
2000). 2To evaluate participant responses, the participant’s conservative rating was added 
to a reverse-scored liberal rating, with higher numbers indicating higher levels of 
conservatism and lower levels of liberalism (Lambert & Raichle, 2000). These scores will 
be useful to test our hypothesis that those of conservative ideologies will score lower in 
optimism and those of liberal ideologies will score higher in optimism, and to further see 
the role of these individual differences in an ambiguous decision-making process.  
Results 
For this study, participants performed a behavioral task followed by two self-
report surveys. In the PGT, participants where shown two wheels in a forced-choice 
format. Participants selected which wheel they would rather play to accumulate the most 
points in a variety of win-dominant, loss-dominant, and ambiguous trials. Participants 
selected win-dominant wheels in trials with clear win and loss outcomes in 94.38% of 
trials (SD = .05). Relatedly, participants scored an average of 374.15 points (SD = 87.47) 
                                                          
2 We used a scale ranging from 0-9 for the Liberal-Conservative Self-Report Scale to 
align with the standard keyboard participants used to enter responses.  
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by the conclusion of the PGT. A Pearson’s correlation was conducted to perform a 
manipulation check on our gambling task. The proportion of times participants chose 
correct, win-dominant responses in the PGT related to the total number of points they 
accumulated by the end of the study, r = .30, p = .004. The selection of win-dominant 
responses in trials with a clear win or loss outcome was related to the accumulation of 
points by the end of the study.  Furthermore, in the ambiguous trials of the PGT, 
participants engaged in an ambiguity-tolerant strategy (i.e., selected the option that 
presented the larger summed green and gray portion) in 45.60% of trails (SD = .29). 
However, the responses on those ambiguous trails exhibited a non-normal distribution 
(see Figure 2., Appendix E). Thus, our results indicate that there were individual 
differences in the strategies participants used while engaging with the PGT. This task was 
followed by the Revised Life Orientation task (M =14.63, SD = 4.19) and the Liberal 
Conservative Self-Report Scale (M = 8.72, SD =4.40) which measured self-reported 
levels of optimism and self-reported levels of conservatism respectively.  
Pearson’s correlations were further used to analyze the data (see Table 2., 
Appendix F). Levels of self-reported optimism failed to relate with choice tendencies in 
the PGT, r = -.08, p = .434. Participants who reported high levels of trait optimism did 
not utilize the ambiguity-tolerant strategy, as conceptualized within our study. 
Furthermore, there was no relationship between self-reported levels of trait optimism and 
self-reported levels of conservative ideology, r = .16, p = .124 as hypothesized. Trait 
optimism also failed to relate with task performance, r = -.015, p = .883. Participants who 
scored high in trait optimism performed similarly well on the gambling task compared to 
participants who scored low in trait optimism. Relatedly, there was no relationship 
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between levels of conservativeness and task performance, r = -.06, p = .559. Participants 
who reported high levels of conservative ideology performed similarly well to 
participants who reported low levels of conservative ideology.   
Furthermore, a confirmatory analysis was conducted to compare the choice 
tendencies and task performances of those who identified as the most and the least 
optimistic on our self-report measure. Participants were separated into three groups based 
on LOT-R results by dividing the sample into lower, middle, and upper thirds. A two-
tailed, independent-samples t-test was used to compare the upper and lower third sub-
samples. There was no significant difference between the choice tendencies of the highest 
scoring optimists and the choice tendencies of the lowest scoring optimists, t(34) = .64, p 
= .528. Participants in the upper third sub-sample did not appear to utilize an ambiguity-
tolerant strategy more (M = .48, SD = .31) than the participants who scored in the lower 
third sub-sample (M = .42, SD = .28). Furthermore, a two-tailed independent-samples t-
test revealed no relationship between the task performance of the highest scoring 
optimists and the lowest scoring optimists, t(34) = .21, p = .839. Participants who scored 
in the upper third sub-sample obtained a similar amount of points (M = 379.44, SD = 
113.01) as the participants who scored in the lower third sub-sample (M = 372.22, SD = 
97.78).  
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to examine individual differences in 
decision-making within an ambiguous choice-task. In the behavioral task used in this 
study, an individual should have objectively ignored the neutral (gray) sections of the 
wheels, as they bore no true win or loss potential; however, we predicted that participants 
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would rely on a tolerant or resistant intuition towards ambiguity in making a decision 
between the two wheels presented. We further predicted that participants who viewed the 
wheels in an ambiguity-tolerant lens would obtain higher scores by taking risks on the 
more neutral-dense wheels in our paradigm, while the participants who viewed the 
wheels with an ambiguity-resistant lens would obtain lower scores as a result of missed 
chances. Finally, we predicted that those who took an ambiguity-tolerant position while 
engaging with our paradigm would score higher in trait optimism and in liberal ideology, 
while those who took an ambiguity-resistant position while engaging with our paradigm 
would score lower in trait optimism and higher in conservative ideology. However, the 
results of this study failed to support the project’s hypotheses. The PGT and our selected 
self-assessments failed to correlate with personality traits with decisions and performance 
on the choice task. Therefore, the results suggest that optimism-liberalism and 
pessimism-conservatism may not relate to one another, nor to the differences in decision-
making as measured by choice tendencies and performance within our behavioral task. 
Participant responses in the current study failed to align with the findings of 
previous research. For instance, Hainaut, Monfort, and Bolmont (2006) found that those 
who scored high in trait optimism payed more attention to positive stimuli, while those 
who scored high in trait pessimism payed more attention to negative stimuli. However, 
the Life Orientation Test (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) failed to reveal an 
association of optimism and pessimism with those expected behavioral tendencies in the 
PGT. The current study revealed no relationship between trait optimism and an 
ambiguity-tolerant strategy, which we conceptualized as an optimistic strategy, within 
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our task. Relatedly, there was no relationship between trait pessimism and an ambiguity-
resistant strategy, which we conceptualized as a pessimistic strategy, within our task.  
Furthermore, previous research suggests an association between the personality 
traits of optimism and pessimism with liberal and conservative political ideologies 
respectively. For instance, Graham et al. (2009) found that conservative-minded 
individuals take a more pessimistic view of the world around them, while liberal-minded 
individuals take a more optimistic view of the world around them. Thus, we hypothesized 
that those who scored high in liberal ideology would also score higher in trait optimism 
and would use the ambiguity-tolerant strategy defined within our task. Similarly, we 
hypothesized that those who scored high in conservative ideology would score lower in 
trait optimism and would use the ambiguity-resistant strategy defined within our task. 
Yet, the results of our experiment failed to support that claim as there was no relationship 
between the personality traits nor the political ideologies as measured by our selected 
assessments.  
Lastly, we suspected that those who scored high in trait optimism-liberalism 
would approach the PGT with an action orientation, as defined by Kuhl (1994), which 
would result in improved performance. However, there was no relationship between trait 
optimism and performance outcomes within our ambiguous task. These findings, 
however, do align with the research conducted by Tenney, Logg, and Moore (2015) 
which suggests that high levels of trait optimism are not always associated with improved 
performance outcomes. Similarly, we predicted that those who scored high in liberal 
ideology would outperform those who scored high in conservative ideology based on the 
findings of Shook and Fazio (2009). Yet, there was also no relationship with task 
DECISION-MAKING  28 
performance and political ideology within this particular paradigm, as those who reported 
high levels of conservative ideology performed just as well on the PGT as those who 
reported high levels of liberal ideology.  
Ultimately, the current study fails to support the hypotheses grounded on previous 
research that individual differences in optimism-liberalism and pessimism-conservatism 
would relate to decisions and performance within an ambiguous choice-task. 
Nonetheless, the PGT was effective in evaluating individual differences in decision-
making across a number of win-dominant, loss-dominant, and ambiguous trails. We did 
see that there were individual differences in decision-making across participants and 
across trials; however, self-reported levels of optimism-liberalism and pessimism-
conservativism were not observed to be the driving factors behind those differences. 
Furthermore, all participants experienced controlled conditions (e.g., same researcher, 
room, lighting, etc.) while performing the gambling task, which was an effective tool for 
minimizing potential confounding variables.  
Nonetheless, this study had several limitations that should be addressed in future 
research. For example, due to time limitations, the current study’s sample size was below 
the number needed for optimal power. Therefore, future data collection will continue for 
final project completion. Also, the selected self-assessments failed to reflect behavioral 
patterns and to correlate with one another as the past literature would have suggested 
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994; Lambert & Raichle, 2000). Thus, selecting different 
self-assessments may be beneficial to determining whether the personality traits in 
question really do relate to one another and to the behavioral differences we saw in the 
choice-task. Furthermore, this study was performed within a small and somewhat select 
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subset of the population (i.e., undergraduate psychology students at Georgia Southern 
University); therefore, the findings of the current study may not be externally valid as 
they may not be generalizable beyond this limited sample. Relatedly, there was a 
disproportionate ratio of female: male participants, so gender may have played a role in 
the findings presented in this study. Lastly, in the view that behavioral tasks represent 
variability in momentary risk-taking tendencies, a limitation of the current project was 
that there was no repeated testing to measure potential changes in participant responses 
(Palminteri & Chevallier, 2018). Perhaps a follow-up replication of this study may show 
more systematic differences among participant choices and a stronger relationship among 
those patterns to the selected measures of optimism-liberalism and pessimism-
conservatism.   
In conclusion, this study failed to support the hypothesis that self-reported levels 
of optimism-liberalism and pessimism-conservatism would relate with choice tendencies 
and performance outcomes within an ambiguous choice-task. Our results indicate that 
there were individual differences in choice tendencies within the crucial ambiguous trials 
of our paradigm; however, trait optimism-liberalism and pessimism-conservatism do not 
appear to be the driving factors behind those differences. Therefore, future research 
should examine other potential factors that may explain the differences in decision-
making under ambiguous conditions. Furthermore, replication of the current study with a 
more generalizable sample and different self-report measures for optimism-pessimism 
and political ideology may also be beneficial to further understand how these individual 
differences play a role in the decision-making process. Future research could also 
replicate the ambiguous-choice task used in this project while adding strength to the 
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element of ambiguity presented in the neutral (gray) sections of this task. Perhaps 
increasing the level of uncertainty associated with the ambiguous area (e.g., the gray 
sector of the wheel serving as a “lid” covering a potential win or loss outcomes) would 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure 1.  
 This figure shows the sequential steps of the gambling paradigm. First, 
participants were asked which of the two wheels they would like to play. Upon 
selection, the chosen wheel spun and landed on an outcome based on the win-loss 
probability of that wheel. If the spinner landed on a green section, the participant 
won 10 points. If the wheel landed on a red section, the participant lost 10 points. 
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Appendix B 
Table 1. 











2 .375 .375 .25 Ambiguous 
3 .25 .25 .50 Ambiguous 
4 .375 .50 .125 Loss-Dominant 
5 .25 .625 .125 Loss-Dominant 
6 .125 .75 .125 Loss-Dominant 
7 .25 .50 .25 Loss-Dominant 
8 .125 .625 .25 Loss-Dominant 
9 0.0 .75 .25 Loss-Dominant 
10 .50 .375 .125 Win-Dominant 
11 .625 .25 .125 Win-Dominant 
12 .75 .125 .125 Win-Dominant 
13 .50 .25 .25 Win-Dominant 
14 .625 .125 .25 Win-Dominant 
15 .75 0.0 .25 Win-Dominant 
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Appendix C 
Life Orientation Test- Revised  
0 = Strongly Disagree       1 = Disagree       2 = Neutral       3 = Agree       4 = Strongly 
Agree 
 
1) In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
 
0            1             2             3            4  
 
2) It’s easy for me to relax.  
 
0            1             2             3            4 
 
3) If something can go wrong for me, it will.  
 
0            1             2             3            4 
 
4) I’m always optimistic about my future. 
 
0            1             2             3            4 
 
5) I enjoy my friends a lot.  
 
0            1             2             3            4 
 
6) It’s important for me to keep busy.  
 
0            1             2             3            4 
 
7) I hardly ever expect things to go my way.  
 
0            1             2             3            4 
 
8) I don’t get upset too easily.  
 
0            1             2             3            4 
 
9) I rarely count on good things happening to me.  
 
0            1             2             3            4 
 
10) Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.  
 
0            1             2             3            4 
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Appendix D 
Liberal-Conservative Self-Report Scale  
 














Not at all Liberal  0    1    2    3   4    5    6    7    8    9    10  Extremely Liberal 
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Appendix E 
Figure 2.   
 This figure illustrates how participants interacted with the crucial 
ambiguous trials of the PGT. As shown in the figure, there were individual 
differences in how participants interacted with the ambiguous choice-task. Some 
participants utilized an ambiguity-tolerant strategy or an ambiguity-resistant 
strategy, as defined within our study, more than others; however, these individual 
differences did not correlate with self-reported levels of optimism nor with self-
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Appendix F 
Table 2. 
 Levels of self-reported optimism failed to relate with an ambiguity-tolerant 
strategy on the PGT, an increased performance on the PGT, nor to self-reported levels of 





Ambiguity-Tolerance Total Points Optimism Conservatism 
Ambiguity-Tolerance .26 (.012) * -    
Total Points .30 (.004) * .04 (.699) -   
Optimism -.09 (.388) -.08 (.434) -.02 (.883) -  
Conservatism -.06 (.539) .12 (.261) -.06 (.559) .16 (.124) - 
*Correlation (two-tailed) 
